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ViolencePersonality disorder is associatedwith self-harm and suicide, as well as criminal offending and violence towards
others. These behaviours overlap when the means chosen to self-harm or attempt suicide put others at risk. In
such circumstances, an individual's mental state at one and the same timemay be deemed to meet the conditions
for criminal responsibility, and to warrant involuntary hospital admission. I explore this tension in how people
with personality disorder are treated at the hands of the criminal and civil law respectively in England and
Wales: theymay be deemed sufﬁcientlymentallywell to be punished for their crimes, but not deemed sufﬁcient-
lymentallywell to retain the right tomake their own decisions aboutmatters of serious importance to their own
lives, includingwhether or not to continue them. The article divides into four sections. After introducing this ten-
sion, Section 2 sketches the nature of personality disorder and the psychologyunderlying self-directed and other-
directed violence. Section 3 addresses the questions ofwhether peoplewith personality disorderwho are violent,
whether towards self or others, typically meet the conditions for criminal responsibility and mental capacity re-
spectively, considering in particular whether their underlying desires and values, or their emotional distress, af-
fect theirmental capacity tomake treatment decisions. Section 4 then considerswhatwemight do to address the
tension, within the conﬁnes of current legislation. Drawing on The Review of the Mental Health Act 1983, I argue
that we are ethically justiﬁed in involuntarily admitting to hospital people with personality disorder who pose
a serious risk to themselves only if we simultaneously undertake to offer genuine help for their future, in the
form of appropriate treatment, social support, and better life opportunities — a provision which, as things
stand in England and Wales, is sorely lacking.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Consider the following clinical vignette:
P has a long history of involvement with mental health services and
is well known to the local police. He has a diagnosis of personality
disorder and takes a number of psychiatric medications, including
sleeping pills and sedatives. He has had repeated hospital admis-
sions due to overdoses and other forms of severe self-harm, usually
in the form of cutting or burning. He drinks regularly, and can be-
come aggressive and threatening, especially when drunk.The police
and the community mental health team are currently trying to lo-
cate P, who made an emergency appointment with his doctor this
morning. P arrived in a dishevelled, agitated, and emotionally dis-
tressed state. Upon questioning, he admitted to intending to kill
himself, but ended the appointment abruptly when his doctor sug-
gested a voluntary admission to hospital, saying his mindwasmade
up and no one could help.P was found late that evening, after spend-
ing the day drinking alone in his car, and then returning home andThis is an open access article undersetting ﬁre to his ﬂat. The smoke and ﬂames alerted a neighbour
who called for help. P suffered smoke inhalation and minor burns.
No one else in the building was injured. P was charged and subse-
quently convicted of arson that recklessly endangered lives. Had P
been found before setting the ﬁre, he would in all likelihood have
been involuntarily admitted to hospital.
P's story is hypothetical, but it will be familiar to many of those who
work with personality disorder in mental health and criminal justice
services. Personality disorder [PD] is associated with self-harm and sui-
cide, as well as criminal offending and violence towards others. These
behaviours overlap only infrequently. Self-harm and suicide has a pro-
found impact on family and friends, but it is rare that themeans chosen
to self-harm or attempt suicide also put others at direct physical risk.
But it does occur. Common examples include attempts to harm or kill
oneself by setting ﬁres, like P, or by driving over bridges or overpasses,
onto railroad lines, or into oncoming trafﬁc or buildings.
P's story sharply highlights a tension in how people with person-
ality disorder are treated by criminal and civil law respectively in
England andWales. On the one hand, prisons in the UK are populated
by people with PD: it is estimated that 64% of male and 50% of femalethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
16 H. Pickard / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015) 15–24offenders have a personality disorder (NOMS, 2011). Offenders with
PD are sometimes diverted from the courts or given a hospital disposal.
But as these statistics testify, they are routinely judged criminally re-
sponsible and correspondingly held to account.1 On the other hand,
people with personality disorder who present to mental health services
at risk of self-harm or suicide can be admitted to hospital under a
Section of theMental Health Act [MHA] in England andWales,which al-
lows involuntary detention and compulsory treatment in the presence
of a mental disorder (including PD) in cases of risk and irrespective of
mental capacity. 2
Good clinical practice aims to avoid involuntary detention and com-
pulsory treatment, especially if previously counter-productive. Howev-
er, if communitymanagement is not a viable option and the risk of harm
to self is judged to be serious, the MHA may be used to admit people
with amental disorder to hospital against their will.3 Especially with re-
spect to people with a mental disorder where risk of harm to self is sta-
ble and long-standing, this may cause clinical disquiet and ethical
unease if grounds are lacking for overriding treatment decisions based
on mental incapacity under the Mental Capacity Act (MCA), which is
the law in England and Wales protecting people who are unable to
make treatment decisions for themselves.4 Under the MCA, treatment
decisions can be made on behalf of patients and in their best interests,
when they are unable to do so themselves due to “an impairment of,
or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” which affects
their capacity for rational deliberation.5 Although theMCA states clearly
that every person is presumed to have themental capacity tomake their
own treatment decisions and,moreover, that the presence of any condi-
tion, such as a mental disorder, cannot in itself justify an assumption to
the contrary, it is nonetheless the case that the presence of amental dis-
order can affect the ability to rationally deliberate. When this is proven
to be so, clinicians can both ethically and legally justify involuntary de-
tention and compulsory treatment of people with mental disorder who
pose a risk to self based onmental incapacity under theMCA, potentially
quelling any sense of disquiet or unease. However, whenmental capac-
ity is retained despite the presence of a mental disorder, then use of the
MHA is required instead.
Only people who have a diagnosis of a mental disorder or for
whom there are grounds to suggest the presence of a mental disor-
der in the absence of a previous diagnosis, and so might beneﬁt
from assessment, can be involuntarily detained and compulsorily
treated under a Section of the MHA due to risk to self.6 In England1 Personality disorder does not usually fall under TheM'Naughten Rules: “to establish a
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accusedwas labouring under such a defect of reason, from dis-
ease of themind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act hewas doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not knowhewas doingwhatwaswrong” (Queen v.M'Naghten (1843)
10 Cl and Fin 20). Nor is a plea of diminished responsibility due tomental abnormality un-
der Section 2(1) of theHomicideAct 1957 necessarily available to reduce amurder convic-
tion to manslaughter.
2 Statistics documenting use of the MHA in cases of personality disorder are not avail-
able, as data pertaining to category of mental disorder has not been collected since 2008.
3 Cf. The NICE Guidelines on Self-harm: the short-term physical and psychological manage-
ment and secondary prevention of self-harm in primary and secondary care: “.... although it is
not a common occurrence, compulsory treatment [under the MHA] can include medical
and surgical treatment for the physical effects of self-harm if the self-harm can be
categorised as either the consequence of or a symptom of the patient's mental disorder”
(NICE, 2004, p. 92). Note that, although good clinical practice will not use the MHA unless
risk to self is judged to be serious, theMHA itself does predicate the power to involuntarily
detain and compulsorily treat on a requirement of serious risk to self or others, but only on
the need for patient “health and safety” or “the protection of other persons” (Sections 2
and 3); there is a severity requirement only with respect to restriction orders imposed
due to risk of harm to others (Section 41).
4 TheMCA has very occasionally been deployed to remove the right to refuse treatment
for self-inﬂicted injury with people with personality disorder. For discussion see Peay
(2011a, 2011b).
5 See Sections 1–4 of theMCA. The nature of mental capacity and its connect to rational
deliberation are discussed further below.
6 Orwho present to the police in need of removal from a public place to a “place of safe-
ty”, suchas a police station or a hospital,where they can thenbekept for 72 h andassessed
by an approved mental health professional or clinician. See Section 136 of the MHA.and Wales, people are allowed to self-harm or attempt suicide if
there is no diagnosis or grounds suggesting the presence of a mental
disorder. Clinical disquiet and ethical unease can result from concern
that, in striking contrast to theMCA, theMHA therefore allows discrim-
ination on grounds of mental disorder.7 Lingering questions – however
inchoate or inarticulate thesemay be – about retention ofmental capac-
ity in such circumstances potentially quell this concern by offering the
possibility of non-discriminatory grounds for differential treatment, as
all people who lack mental capacity to make their own treatment deci-
sions, mentally disordered or not, fall under the MCA. Especially as
mental capacity admits of degrees and borderline cases, it is natural to
wonder about the extent to which it is retained during periods of seri-
ous risk to self, even if, strictly speaking, the conditions speciﬁed by
the MCA as determining an ability to make one's own decisions likely
obtain. Hence part of the tacit acceptance of use of theMHA in such con-
texts by practicing clinicians may be an underlying uncertainty about
the person's mental capacity — a feeling that something about their
state of mind warrants interference if and when they fail to act in
what appears to be their own best interests.8
P's story sharply highlights the tension in how people with personality
disorder are treated at the hands of criminal and civil law because hismen-
tal state at one and the same time is deemed tomeet the conditions required
for criminal responsibility, and to warrant involuntary hospital admission.
For, again, had he been found before setting the ﬁre, he would in all likeli-
hood have been detained under civil law, as opposed to prosecuted under
criminal law. Self-harm, suicide, and violence towards others no doubt
demand considered and often robust interventions by the state, and the
various purposes of, and potential justiﬁcations for, criminal and civil law
are of course varied and different. There are no doubt many ways we
might attempt to reconcile and rationalize P's treatment by criminal and
civil law respectively. But it is nonetheless difﬁcult not to feel, at heart,
that P gets a raw deal. For, whichever way he turns, he is subjected to the
strong arm of the law— deemed sufﬁciently mentally well to be punished
for his crimes, but not deemed sufﬁciently mentally well to retain the right
to make his own decisions about matters of serious importance to his own
life, including whether or not to continue it.
The aim of this article is to explore this tension and make some ten-
tative suggestions about how we might better manage the “awkward
questions” that personality disorder raises.9 The structure is as follows.
Section 2 sketches the nature of personality disorder and aspects of the
psychology underlying self-directed violence on the one hand, and
other-directed violence on the other. A natural suggestion for resolving
the tension is that (cases like P's notwithstanding) the psychology un-
derlying self-directed and other-directed violence associated with PD
is fundamentally distinct, with the state of mind associated with
harming oneself expressing pathology, and the state of mind associated
with harming others expressing a more rational mentality. I argue that
this distinction cannot be sustained in a way that supports the differ-
ence in treatment by criminal and civil law. Section 3 addresses the
vexed questions of whether people with PD who are violent, whether
towards self or others, typically meet the conditions for criminal re-
sponsibility andmental capacity respectively; and I consider in particu-
lar whether their underlying desires and values, or their emotional
distress, affect their mental capacity to make treatment decisions.
Although all judgements must be made on a case-by-case basis, I
suggest that the conditions for both criminal responsibility and mental
capacitymay often bemet. Section 4 considers whatwemight do to ad-
dress the tension, within the conﬁnes of current legislation. Drawing on7 For discussion see Hope (2004) and Richardson (2013). This feature of the MHA con-
travenes one of the core guiding principles of The Review of the Mental Health Act 1983:
“The desire to promote the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of mental ill health
has been fundamental to theCommittee's approach, and this has led to an emphasis onpa-
tient autonomy” (Richardson et al., 1999, p. 3). See too Sections 2.14–2.16.
8 A further reasonmay be fear of investigation and litigation if patients with personality
disorder commit suicide or seriously harm themselves when in care.
9 To borrow a phrase from Peay (2011b).
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argue that we are ethically justiﬁed in involuntarily detaining and ad-
mitting to hospital thosewith PDwho pose a serious risk to themselves
only if we simultaneously undertake to offer genuine help for their fu-
ture, in the form of appropriate treatment, social support, and better
life opportunities— a provision which, as things stand, is sorely lacking.
Before progressing, it is however important to note the difference in
the psychological conditions required by law for criminal responsibility
as opposed to mental capacity, as prima facie this might be thought to
offer a simple resolution to the identiﬁed tension. Criminal responsibility
depends on the idea of a voluntary act. Minimally, the offendermust pos-
sess cognitive and volitional abilities such that they knew what they
were doing at the time of the offence, and had a choice and exercised suf-
ﬁcient control in doing so. Although choice involves a sharp line, in that if
a person had a choice at all, theymust have had at least two – namely, to
act as they did, or to refrain from so acting – the extent towhich a person
knows or has control over what they are doing permits of degrees and
borderline cases, which may serve to mitigate criminal responsibility.
But such complexities aside, the basic concept of criminal responsibility
depends on a degree of voluntary choice and control — the offender
could have not done it.10 In contrast, mental capacity as deﬁned by the
MCA requires the ability to rationally deliberate about a particular
matter — where this is understood as a cognitive process involving the
abilities to understand, retain, and weigh relevant information, to come
to a decision for oneself. This is intended to offer value-neutral conditions
for mental capacity, allowing assessments to be made apart from any
judgement about the wisdom of the person's decision.
The concepts of choice and of rational deliberation are distinct. Some-
times, of course, the acts of choosing and deliberating are connected:
faced with uncertainty as to what to do, we may rationally deliberate in
order to make a choice. Nonetheless, it is possible to have a choice – in
that one could have not donewhat one did – even though one did not ra-
tionally deliberate prior to choosing. E.g. perhaps one acted without
thought, on the spur of the moment, but still, in the moment, one could
have stopped. Equally, it is possible to rationally deliberate and come to
a clear decision, which one then chooses not to act on. E.g. perhaps
one's emotions move one to act in the moment against one's best judge-
ment, prior deliberation notwithstanding. However, despite the differ-
ences in the concepts of choice and of rational deliberation, and
correspondingly the conditions required for criminal responsibility as op-
posed to mental capacity, the tension identiﬁed nonetheless stands.
The reason is that intuitively, both criminal responsibility and
mental capacity are underpinned by considerations of autonomy,
broadly conceived. It seems correct to hold a person criminally respon-
sible only if what they didwas up to them— they could have not done it
and so in that sense the action was their own.11 Equally, when a person
rationally deliberates and comes to a treatment decision that counts as
their own – free from external or internal alien forces, and so it would
seem in line with their own desires and values – then their decision
ought to be respected, no matter how unwise it may seem to others.1210 Note that this modal claim can be interpreted in various ways; one inﬂuential view is
that the offender must have had a fair opportunity not to have done it (Hart, 2008). See
Ashworth (2009) ch. 6 for legal discussion. For philosophical discussion of its interpreta-
tion in relation to the traditional problem of free will, see Holton (2010), List (2014),
and Whittle (2014).
11 Cf. Ashworth: “To proceed to conviction without proof of voluntary conduct would be
to fail, in the most fundamental way, to show respect for individuals as rational, choosing
beings. More generally, if people were liable to conviction despite doing nothing, or be-
cause something had been done to them, this would fail to respect their autonomy”
(2009, p. 86). See too Ashworth (2009 ch. 2). This idea is also important within contempo-
rary just deserts theory. For discussion, see e.g. von Hirsch (1976, 1993), von Hirsch and
Ashworth (1998), and McDermott (2001).
12 This is one of the basic principles of medical ethics. See Beauchamp and Childress
(2009). For discussion with respect to the MCA, see e.g. Mackenzie and Rogers (2013)
and Richardson (2013). It is also endorsed by The Review of the Mental Health Act 1983
which emphasises the importance of patient autonomyunderstood as “the freedom to de-
cide for oneself, the ability to make choices which others will respect” (Richardson et al.,
1999, p. 18).It is beyond the scope of this article to offer a discussion of the
many facets of our concept of autonomy and how they might under-
pin and unify (or fail to) criminal responsibility and mental capacity
in law.13 The point to emphasise here is that the tension identiﬁed
cannot be waved aside, simply by pointing to the different concepts
and conditions pertaining to criminal responsibility versus mental
capacity. For, as soon as we probe deeper, the intuition that some-
thing is amiss reappears, now under the guise of the concept of au-
tonomy and what that implies, on the one hand, with respect to
our right to insist that a person face the consequences of their
(broadly conceived, autonomous) actions, and, on the other, with re-
spect to a person's right to have their (broadly conceived, autono-
mous) decisions respected. In other words, the difference in
concepts and conditions of criminal and mental capacity law not-
withstanding, it remains difﬁcult to reconcile the fact that P's mental
state at one and the same time can be used to underwrite a ﬁnding
that he is criminally responsible for endangering others, with, poten-
tially, a refusal to respect his decision to end his own life.
2. Personality disorder and violence towards self and others
The ICD-1014 describes personality disorder as follows (WHO, 1992):
These types of condition comprise deeply ingrained and enduring
behaviour patterns, manifesting themselves as inﬂexible responses
to a broad range of personal and social situations. They represent ei-
ther extreme or signiﬁcant deviations from the way the average in-
dividual in a given culture perceives, thinks, feels, and particularly
relates to others. Such behaviour patterns tend to be stable and to
encompass multiple domains of behaviour and psychological func-
tioning. They are frequently, but not always, associated with various
degrees of subjective distress and problems in social functioning and
performance.
It also stipulates the following criteria as diagnostic guidelines:
(a) markedly disharmonious attitudes and behaviour, involving usu-
ally several areas of functioning, e.g. affectivity, arousal, impulse
control, ways of perceiving and thinking, and style of relating to
others;
(b) the abnormal behaviour pattern is enduring, of long standing,
and not limited to episodes of mental illness;
(c) the abnormal behaviour pattern is pervasive and clearly mal-
adaptive to a broad range of personal and social situations;
(d) the above manifestations always appear during childhood or ad-
olescence and continue into adulthood;
(e) the disorder leads to considerable personal distress but this may
only become apparent late in its course;
(f) the disorder is usually, but not invariably, associated with signif-
icant problems in occupational and social performance.
Unlike e.g. schizophrenia andmood disorders, PD is not convention-
ally understood as an illness or disease; nor is it typically characterised
by delusions or psychotic thinking. Rather, as the name implies, it is a
disorder of the personality: an enduring tendency of mind and pattern13 For a survey of the different facets of our concept of autonomy, see Stoljar (2006).
Radoilska (2012) is a collection on autonomy in relation to mental disorder.
14 The ICD-10 is broadly similar to the DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5, which deﬁne personality
disorder as an enduring pattern of experience and behaviour that deviatesmarkedly from
the expectations of an individual's culture and is manifest in (at least two of the following
areas of) cognition, affectivity, interpersonal functioning, and impulse control. The pattern
must be inﬂexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations;
lead to clinically signiﬁcant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other impor-
tant areas of functioning; be stable and of long duration, with its onset traceable at least to
adolescence or early adulthood; and not be better accounted for by diagnosiswith another
mental disorder or due to direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g. a drug of abuse)
or a general medical condition (e.g. head trauma) (APA, 1994, 2013).
17 For further discussion of some of the philosophical and psychological elements within
the therapeutic process, see Pearce and Pickard (2013), Pickard (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015),
and Wood et al. (2014). For two classic discussions of some of the clinical challenges of
working with people with personality disorder, see Main (1957) and Vaillant (1992).
18 To take but a few examples, self-mutilation and the endurance of pain is a part of
many religious and cultural rituals; suicide may be a rational, considered, and digniﬁed
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the kind of person someone is, a part of who they are.
Very roughly, personality is the set of standing, psychological traits
that comprise the ways a person is inclined to think, feel, and act. Per-
sonality disorder occurs when this set of traits is maladaptive, causing
personal distress and impairment in social, occupational, or other im-
portant contexts: the ways a person is inclined to think, feel, and act
do them harm, directly or via effects on functioning. Diagnosis with a
PD requires that these traits are stable, pervasive, difﬁcult to control or
change, and markedly different from cultural expectations. Equally,
the extent to which they are maladaptive must be sufﬁcient to warrant
clinical attention. Nonetheless, all of us possess traits that sometimes in-
cline us to think, feel, and act in ways that cause us harm. Personality
disorder lies on a continuum with normal human personality.
The broad category of ICD-10 personality disorder is divided into
a variety of types. These include Paranoid, Schizoid, Dissocial, Emotion-
ally Unstable (there is both an Impulsive and Borderline sub-type), His-
trionic, Anankastic, Dependent, Anxious (also known as Avoidant), and
Mixed and various other types.15 A person cannot be diagnosed with
any particular type of PD unless the general diagnostic guidelines
(a)–(f) are met. But, given this, what kind of PD a person has will de-
pend on what kind of personality they have: on the nature of the mal-
adaptive tendency of mind and pattern of behaviour.
With respect to aetiology, PD is associatedwith genetic factors (Jang
& Vernon, 2001) but also environmental conditions (Paris, 2001). These
include dysfunctional families, where there is breakdown, death, insti-
tutional care, and parental psychopathology; traumatic childhood expe-
riences, with high levels of sexual, emotional, and physical abuse or
neglect; and social stressors, such as war, poverty, and migration.
There are high levels of co-morbidity among personality disorders,
and between personality disorders and psychotic disorders, eating dis-
orders, anxiety, depression (Hayward & Moran, 2008; Lenzenweger,
Lane, Loranger, & Kessler, 2007), and especially substance abuse
(Lenzenweger et al., 2007; Thomas, Melchert, & Banken, 1999). Finally,
a study usingDSMpersonality disorder classiﬁcations found that people
with Cluster B PDs,16 which corresponds roughly with a combination of
ICD-10 Dissocial, Emotionally Unstable, and Histrionic personality dis-
orders, are 10 times more likely to have a criminal conviction and 8
times more likely to have spent time in prison compared to those with-
out (Coid et al., 2006); equally, there is also a strong association be-
tween these PDs and self-harm, suicide and violence towards others
(Coid et al., 2006); with self-harm further associated with childhood
sexual abuse, and violence towards others further associated with
childhood psychical abuse (Waxman, Fenton, Skodol, Grant, & Hasin,
2014).
As this picture suggests, people with personality disorder often
come from backgrounds of extreme psycho-social and economic
adversity, have been victims of trauma, neglect, and abuse in child-
hood, and lead chaotic, fragmented, and despairing lives as adults,
suffering high levels of psychological distress and social marginaliza-
tion. They also place a heavy burden on psychiatric, medical, social,
legal and forensic services. Within psychiatry, people with personal-
ity disorder have long been stigmatized as the patients “no one likes”
and personality disorder itself considered impossible to treat. But,
over the past two decades, this has started to change, with emerging
evidence-based consensus that improvement and even recovery is
often possible, through a range of psychological treatments, sometimes15 These correspond roughly but not exactly to the types listed in DSM-IV and DSM-5.
The DSM divides the broad category of personality disorder into three sub-categories or
“clusters”. Cluster A comprises paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality disorder.
These are more colloquially known as the odd and eccentric or “mad” PDs. Cluster B com-
prises narcissistic, borderline, histrionic, and anti-social personality disorder. These are
more colloquially known as the dramatic, emotional, and erratic or “bad” PDs. Cluster C
comprises obsessive-compulsive, avoidant, and dependent personality disorder. These
are more colloquially known as the anxious and fearful or “sad” PDs.
16 See fn 15.offered in conjunction with (typically time-limited) medication (NICE,
2009; NIMHE, 2003;Wood, Bolton, Lovell, & Morgan, 2014). These psy-
chological treatments work by helping people alter or at least better
manage the more problematic traits comprising their personality. Al-
though all psychological treatments are multi-pronged and complex,
and there are of course differences between them, to be effective they
must to some extent target criterion (a) of the ICD-10 diagnostic guide-
lines, addressing themaladaptive attitudes and behaviour, including af-
fectivity, arousal, impulse control, ways of perceiving and thinking, and
style of relating to others.17 The basic assumption underlying psycho-
logical treatment is that personality is not ﬁxed, but at least to some ex-
tent ﬂexible. Personality traits develop in response not only to genetic
but also environmental factors: ways of thinking, feeling, and acting
are learned, and can therefore to some extent be unlearned, altered,
and adapted through treatment. In other words, people with personal-
ity disorder can change in their cognitive, affective, behavioural, and in-
terpersonal traits, and learn to do things differently.
Self-harm, suicide, and violence towards others of course need not
be associated with mental disorder of any sort, and can have many dif-
ferent underlyingmotivations.18 But in the context of personality disor-
der and its associated background, they are clinically understood to
have a set of speciﬁc functions.
Considerﬁrst violence towards others. From our shared cultural per-
spective, its functions are not difﬁcult to fathom. But in addition to the
use of violence as a direct means to procuring material goods, violence
can serve (but is not restricted to) the following ends19:
(1) Affect regulation. The expression, release, and communication of
aggressive impulses and strong emotions, especially anger.
(2) Social and/or interpersonal dominance and/or control and the var-
ious beneﬁts it accrues, often in conformity with cultural stereo-
types of masculinity.
(3) Revenge. Retaliation/retribution towards those who have perpe-
trated psychological and/or physical harm to the agent or some-
one they care about.
(4) Protection from future harm. Violence can signal a willingness to
retaliate/seek retribution and so act as a deterrent, when directed
towards those who have perpetrated past harm or are threaten-
ing to perpetrate future harm.
When associated with PD, violence towards others may fulﬁl such
functions. First and foremost, it can be driven by aggression and
anger— away of expressing, releasing, and communicating strong emo-
tions. This may have roots in childhood experiences of violence in the
family or wider community, where there may have been little opportu-
nity for alternative ways of managing anger and other emotions to be
learned. Indeed, violence can be part of the fabric of a community, ac-
cepted and even expected, as necessary to success and survival. Espe-
cially given such a background, violence may also serve for those with
PD as a means to establish control when they perceive a threat to
their physical or psychological wellbeing, including the potentialchoice for those who are terminally ill, as well as an act of political protest or moral or re-
ligious faith; combatant violence is considered normal and justiﬁable within war. For dis-
cussion see Favazza (1987) and Fincham, Langer, Scourﬁeld, and Shiner (2011).
19 It is important to distinguish what has been labelled “reactive” or emotionally “hot”
violence associatedwith personality disorder, fromwhat has been labelled “instrumental”
or emotionally “cold and calculating” violence associated with psychopathy. For discus-
sion of this distinction and the empirical data supporting it, see e.g. Blair, Mitchell, and
Blair (2005), Howells (2009), and Raine (2013). The focus of this article is “reactive” or
“hot” violence associatedwith personality disorder. However, the labelling is unfortunate,
as reactive violence is also instrumental, in the sense of serving various functions or ends,
as speciﬁed above.
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treatment. And, as with all patterns of behaviour that fulﬁl various
functions effectively, violence can become a habit. Interventions for
violence associated with PD typically involve creating a narrative un-
derstanding of how past experience has impacted on development;
identifying and avoiding triggers; reﬂecting on emotions, and learn-
ing alternative ways of managing aggression, anger, and resolving
conﬂict — all within a therapeutic environment that offers support,
compassion, and understanding.20 But the basic point is that from
our shared cultural perspective, personality disordered violence to-
wards others appears rational: a natural way of expressing, releasing,
and communicating aggression, anger, and other emotions, and a
means to achieving ends we can easily understand why people in a
variety of contexts would have.
In contrast, the functions of self-directed violence are less easy to
fathom from our shared cultural perspective. Indeed, it can be difﬁcult
even to conceptualise self-harm and suicide as violence at all.21
Violence is standardly deﬁned as behaviour involving physical force
intended to hurt, damage, or kill. There is no stipulation that the victim
andperpetrator cannot be identical. Not all forms of self-harmor suicide
involve physical force as we commonly understand it. E.g. over-dosing
or self-poisoningmay aim at damage or death, but not employ physical
force. Equally, although self-harm is typically deliberate, it can be un-
consciously motivated: self-inﬂicted injury may sometimes pass as an
“accident” even to the injurer. But such caveats notwithstanding,
many central instances of self-harm and suicide – like cutting,
scratching, burning, or smashing one's body parts with weapons or
against walls; swallowing blades or sharp glass or inserting them
under the skin or in oriﬁces; hanging oneself, shooting oneself, or
throwing one's body under trains or off buildings – straightforwardly
meet the standard deﬁnition of violence.
From our shared cultural perspective, such behaviour can seem
the epitome of irrationality. For what could possibly be gained by
doing it? People who do not self-harm themselves, or lack personal
or professional experience with those who do, may have limited re-
sources for understanding what ends it could serve and hence why
anyone would act thus. We commonly think that, when people can
act so as to avoid harm to themselves, they do. But people who
self-harm do precisely the opposite of this — they act to directly
harm themselves. We may therefore ﬁnd ourselves inclining to the
view that self-harm can only be understood as an expression of un-
derlying pathology. For, without an understanding of its functions,
no sense can be made of why any person would do this if they could
help it.
It is important to emphasise again that self-harm and suicide need
not be associated with mental disorder of any sort, and that there can
bemany different underlyingmotivations. But in a context of personal-
ity disorder and its associated background, clinical understanding and
patient self-reports reveal self-harm as serving at least six ends that
help explain why, in general, people with personality disorder may do
so.22
Self-directed ends of self-harm:20 For general discussion of violence and personality disorder, see McMurran and How-
ard (2009). McMurran (2009) offers a short summary of Stop&Think! — an intervention
designed to promote pro-social problem solving as an alternative to violence. For discus-
sion of the role of narrative in effective therapy for personality disorder, see Pickard
(2014).
21 For discussion see Motz (2008) and Pickard (in press).
22 For a classic discussion of personality disorder and self-harm, see Tantum andWhitta-
ker (1993). Motz (2009a) is an excellent recent collection of articles about self-harm, par-
ticularly in relation to forensic contexts. See too Motz (2008) especially chapter 6, and the
NICE Guidelines 2011 for longer-term management of self-harm. There are also an in-
creasing number of patient self-reports available on-line and in medical textbooks and
guidelines. Hawton, Saunders, andO'Connor (2012) is a comprehensive reviewofmedical
and social science studies of self-harm in adolescents. See Klonsky (2007) for a review of
the evidence outlining the functions of self-harm.(1) Affect regulation. People with PD suffer great emotional dis-
tress. Self-harm can be a way of managing strong emotions,
perhaps especially anger and shame, which can be particu-
larly strong in those who come from backgrounds of
psycho-social and economic adversity and suffered child-
hood neglect and abuse. It may offer relief in various ways:
by distracting from emotional pain by replacing it with phys-
ical pain and/or releasing endorphins; by providing a way of
expressing, releasing, and acting on anger and aggression,
just as with violence towards others; or, in contrast, by
allowing people to feel something in the face of dissociation
and emotional numbing. In other words, self-harm can
offer short-term relief from negative emotional experience:
it is a coping mechanism.
(2) Self-punishment. People with PD typically have extremely
low self-esteem, and often believe they are bad and deserve
to be harmed. Self-harm can be both expressive of and ex-
plained by this, especially in face of strong emotions of
anger and shame.
Other-directed ends of self-harm:
(3) Communication. Self-harm can be a way of communicating in-
ternal distress by symbolizing emotions in concrete, physical
form: “the public expression of […] private pain” (Adshead,
1997, p. 11). People with personality disorder often struggle
to identify and talk about their feelings. Self-harm offers a
powerful way of demonstrating what they are going through,
and, potentially, thereby seeking care and help.
(4) Other-punishment. It is common to feel aggressive, angry, and
want to be violent towards those who have harmed us or
others we care about. Self-harm can offer a safe way of ex-
pressing anger and related emotions, when violence towards
others is deemed unacceptable. This function of self-harm cor-
relates with the experience of being attacked that self-harm
can provoke in others, as it becomes like a symbolic weapon,
turning anger towards others inwards on the self, while yet
communicating it.
Self-directed and other-directed ends of self-harm:
(5) Control. Self-harm can create a sense of empowerment and con-
trol by establishing ownership over one's body in face of the ex-
perience of being helpless and violated. This may be especially
important for those with childhood experience of physical and
sexual abuse. For people whose bodies have been harmed by
others, it can be an act both of reclaiming their body and, to use
Anna Freud's (1992) concept of identiﬁcation with the perpetra-
tor, establishing that it is they, and no one else, who now has
dominance and control.
A desire for death:
(6) The continuum with suicide. When associated with personality
disorder, the desire to kill oneself is typically understood as
expressive of hopelessness and despair — a desire for perma-
nent escape from the suffering of living. In contrast, self-
harm offers short-term relief, and hence, as Anna Motz has el-
oquently argued, can be seen instead as an act of hope (Motz,
2009b) — an afﬁrmation of life. However, although the idea of
suicide is distinguished from self-harm by nature of intent – to
die rather than to do harm or damage – in reality the distinc-
tion between them is often unclear, with people unsure and,
even more, indifferent with respect to intended outcome as
well as reckless in methods, so that self-harm regularly and
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sciously aim at it.23
The extreme anguish, anger, and shame that can underlie self-harm
are typically linked to the adverse and traumatic backgrounds typical of
those with PD. In this context, self-harm is a means to ends that we can
understand why people would have, such as relief from negative
emotional experience, expression and communication, seeking care,
attacking or punishing those perceived to have done wrong (including
oneself), and gaining a sense of power and control in the face of feelings
of helplessness and violation. In so far as it fulﬁls these functions effective-
ly, self-harm can become a habit. Interventions for self-harm associated
with PD typically involve creating a narrative understanding of how
past experience has impacted on development; identifying and avoiding
triggers of self-harm; improving self-esteem; reﬂecting on emotions,
and learning alternative ways of managing the anguish, anger, and
shame — all within a therapeutic environment that offers support, com-
passion, and understanding.24 But the basic point is that, via proper atten-
tion to clinical understanding and self-reports, self-harm is like violence
towards others in that it can be understood as rational: a way of express-
ing, releasing, and communicating anguish, anger, shame, and associated
beliefs and impulses, and so providing relief from these as well as achiev-
ing a raft of other ends that it is understandable to have— especially given
the life circumstances and genuinely available alternative options and re-
sources, both internal and external, associated with PD.
P's story is unusual: it is rare for people with personality disorder to
put others at direct physical risk when they deliberately try to harm or
kill themselves. But it is possible to understand why it happens. Self-
directed violence may be a way of turning anger towards others in-
wards onto the self, as well as ameans of communicating it, and, poten-
tially, symbolically or actually punishing others. In the grip of strong
emotions, anger towards others that is being directed onto the self
may end up being turned back onto others, via recklessness, indiffer-
ence, and, potentially, conscious or unconscious motivations, with re-
spect to the means chosen to self-harm or attempt suicide. In other
words, P's state of mind at one and the same time may contain aggres-
sive impulses directed both towards himself and towards others.
Summing up, people with PD use both self-directed and other-
directed violence for various and sometimes overlapping purposes, in-
cluding but not restricted to affect regulation, expression and communi-
cation of emotions, and the establishment of power and control. There is
of course an important difference: self-directed violence does not indi-
cate awillingness to be violent towards others, and somaymark a differ-
ence in attitude towards morality and law, as well as ipso facto in
criminality. But it is not possible to draw a sharp line between self-
directed violence aspathological, and other-directed violence as rational.
They both display instrumental reasoning, and serve ends that are evi-
dently desirable or valuable. Hence what distinction there is between
them cannot comfortably support the difference in treatment by crimi-
nal and civil law.
3. Emotions, deliberation, choice
Most of our actions do not ﬂow from a process of rational delibera-
tion— they justﬂow. Consider, for instance, an ordinarymorning routine:
the alarm clock rings and we get up and get washed, dressed, ready for23 Motz (2008, 2009a) containsmoving self-reports and penetrating clinical understand-
ing of self-harm. To give amereﬂavour of some of these, consider the following self-report
which describes self-harm as serving some, though not all, of the above functions: “I need-
ed to kill something in me, this awful feeling like worms tunnelling along my nerves. So
when I discovered the razor blade, cutting, if you'll believe me, was my gesture of hope.
All the chaos, the sound and fury, the confusion and uncertainty and despair — all of it
evaporated in an instant and I was for that minute grounded, coherent, whole. Here is
the irreducible self. I drew the line in the sand, marked my body as mine, its ﬂesh and
its blood under my command” (quoted in Motz, 2009a, p. 47).
24 See references in footnote 11 and Pickard (in press) for further discussion.work and the school run. These actions are guided by reasons and serve
various ends – to get to work, to get the kids to school – without any
need for us to reﬂect on what we are doing and decide which action out
of the range of available alternatives we ought to perform. We just per-
form the morning routine. Of course, within this routine, we may at
times be stopped short, and required to deliberate and decide what to
do. Finding there's no cereal left in the box for breakfast, we face the ques-
tionwhat to eat instead? But action does not depend on such deliberation
in order to be guided by reasons and subject to choice and a degree of
control — at least in the minimal sense identiﬁed above as a condition
of criminal responsibility. In full ﬂow of acting, we yet have the capacity
to choose not to act — at the very least, to stop the ﬂow.25
Violence, especially if habitual, can be part of the ﬂow. There may be
no antecedent process of deliberation, and yet, as described in Section 2,
it can be guided by reasons and serve various ends. In addition, we are
inclined to believe that violence is on many occasions subject to choice
and a degree of control — precisely in that the person could have not
done it. In general, people are capable of choosing not to act violently—
to stop the ﬂow.
The evidence for this presumption is straightforward: when sufﬁ-
ciently motivated to refrain from (self-directed or other-directed) vio-
lence in a variety of contexts, people do. Consider, for instance, a man
who “sees red” and routinely gets into conﬂicts and resorts to violence—
exceptwhen in view of a policeman. On such occasions, he is highlymo-
tivated not to lash out, which he would otherwise do, lest he be
detained and charged with common assault. This is the classic “police-
man at the shoulder” test. Our natural understanding of this test is
that it shows that this man has the capacity to choose not to be violent
and control his aggression— a capacity, of course, that he only exercises
when sufﬁciently motivated to do so. Similar kinds of “at the shoulder”
tests exist for self-directed violence, aswhen e.g. a personwho routinely
self-harms ensures that their children never witness it, or stops “cold
turkey” as a condition of participating in a therapy group.26 There is a
basic, commonsense distinction between what a person can do but
won't (because they don't want to) as opposed to what a person
wants to do but can't (because they lack the capacity). In so far as violent
behaviour (in those with or without PD) is responsive to incentives, it
appears to be subject to choice and a degree of control. Exercising this
capacity and desisting from violence would seem to be, in general,
something people can dobut sometimes don't, as opposed to something
they want to do but can't.27
Nonetheless, it is extremely important to recognize how difﬁcult it
may be for people to exercise the capacity to desist from violence, espe-
cially when, as with personality disorder, it may both be habitual and
serve valuable ends, which people may lack genuine or perceived alter-
native means of achieving. E.g. in so far as violence offers affect regula-
tion, refraining from violence may require a person to undergo
emotional distress and bear feelings of extreme anger and shame, un-
less and until alternative ways of coping with these are learned. They
may, in other words, be subject to a form of internal duress if they
choose to refrain. Equally, the general presumption that violence is sub-
ject to choice and a degree of control may, of course, be defeated in par-
ticular circumstances. Perhaps sometimes a person who “sees red”
becomes so angry that something “boils over” or “snaps” and choice
and control is lost — they are not then able to stop the ﬂow towards
violence.28 But in general, the presumption that people with PD meet25 Cf. Holton (2006), to which my understanding of the relationship between delibera-
tion, choice, and action, is highly indebted.
26 For further discussion see Pickard (2013, in press).
27 For discussion of this formof argument in relation to addiction, see Pickard (2012, 2015).
28 Holton and Shute (2007) draw on philosophy and psychology to understand the na-
ture of loss of control and link it to the defence of provocation. Although this defence
was abolished and replacedwith a loss of self-control defence under The Coroners and Jus-
tice Act 2009 Sections 54–6, which widens the emotions relevant to the defence, Holton
and Shute's discussion of the philosophy and psychology is yet relevant. See too Horder
(2005) for discussion of the role of fear alongside anger in loss of self-control.
33 Intriguingly, Szmukler suggests that the process of administering the test was itself
therapeutic — offering the patients a quantity of time and quality of engagement that is
rare, and which may indeed have enabled them to better think through their decisions
to refuse treatment.
34 For discussion of this case, see Peay (2011a, 2011b).
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seems plausible, even if on particular occasions this is mitigated by in-
ternal duress or loss of control.
What now of mental capacity? Recall that the MCA understands
mental capacity as a cognitive process involving the abilities to under-
stand, retain, and weigh relevant information, to come to a decision
for oneself. There are two standard concerns that might be thought to
bear on whether people with PD possess mental capacity when risking
serious harm to self. The ﬁrst pertains to the nature of the desires and
values they use in the cognitive process of deliberating. The second per-
tains to their underlying state of emotional distress. Let us take these in
turn.
Weighing information requires a background set of desires or values
for it to be weighed against. Although not encoded in the MCA, there is
broad agreement within the relevant literature on mental capacity and
autonomy that, following Brock and Buchanan, these desires and values
must be stable and enduring commitments.29 When people make deci-
sions with serious consequences that appear to be unwise or against
their best interests, these should not be based onwhim. Tomorrow's re-
gret offers a reason to override today's decision, as it provides an indica-
tion that the desires and values shaping the decision are not part of a
person's authentic self or standing goals, but due to sudden impulse. A
degree of diachronic continuity is therefore an important part of identi-
fying the desires and values that shape autonomousdecisions.30 Signs of
ambivalence and actions that are out of character offer evidence that
this condition is not met.
Returning to P, as his story is told, there are signs of ambivalence. De-
spite claiming his mindwasmade up and no one could help, P made an
emergency appointment with this doctor, in effect asking for help. Such
ambivalence is importantwhen considering self-harm and suicide in re-
lation to PD. If a person is whole-heartedly committed to a course of ac-
tion, they will usually try to avoid contact with people or services that
might stand in their way. When people with PD voluntarily contact ser-
vices that may prevent them from harming or killing themselves, there
is reason to think they are not committed to doing so and hence to over-
ride treatment decisions.
However, people with PD may also try to avoid contact, or to indi-
cate in advance that, if it does occur, they do not wish to be treated.
This was so in Kerry Wooltorton's case, who was allowed to die from
self-poisoning, having written a letter stating clearly that she did not
wish to receive life-saving but only palliative treatment.31 In some
cases, there may be no signs of ambivalence or reason for thinking
that the desires and values underlying the decision do not express sta-
ble and enduring commitments. Although people with PD (especially
Emotionally Unstable PD) may be impulsive and reckless, with an un-
stable sense of self, the desire to self-harm may be relatively constant
and pervasive. Indeed, people sometimes have a clear and strong com-
mitment to killing themselves if life becomes unbearable, as this can
offer control and solace — they know they have an escape from pain
and suffering if and when they need it.32
In this respect, it matters that personality disorder is not understood
as an illness or disease, but as internal to the kind of person someone is.
For there is no “authentic” or “non-personality-disordered” self who
possesses a stable sense of self-worth and is concerned for their future,
to which we can appeal in order to explain why the self-destructive de-
sires and values under consideration are not the person's own. Rather,
as described in Section 2 above, people with personality disorder may
devalue themselves tremendously, and have little commitment to life
or wellbeing. Although there may be some cases where there is29 For discussion see Buchanan and Brock (1989).
30 For discussion of the arguments and objections with respect to this position, see Crai-
gie (2013). Note that it is important to acknowledge that diachronic change in desires and
values can be normal and part of a developing and authentic self.
31 For discussion of the case see David et al. (2010) and Richardson (2013).
32 As described in Novel on Yellow Paper by Stevie Smith (1936).evidence that the desires and values underlying a decision are not stable
and enduring commitments, in other cases this consideration cannot be
adduced to override treatment decisions.
Consider next the second standard concern bearing on mental ca-
pacity, namely, the fact that people with PD who want to self-harm or
kill themselves are typically in great emotional distress. Within clinical
contexts, it is usually presumed that peoplewith PDwill pass a standard
mental capacity assessment, even when emotionally distressed. This
may be one reason why tools such as the Mac-CAT-T are rarely used: a
recent preliminary study conducted by George Szmukler that adminis-
tered the Mac-CAT-T to two personality disordered patients who re-
fused treatment for self-harm found them to have capacity (Szmukler,
2009).33 But despite this presumption, there may yet be concern that
emotional distress nonetheless disrupts the ability tomake autonomous
decisions, and uncertainty as to whether the available tools accurately
assess this.
This concern may arise in part because of the culturally prevalent
conception of emotions as disturbances to reasoning and rationality.
Indeed, in one of the rare cases where the MCA in addition to the
MHA was considered by the courts as a basis for overriding treat-
ment refusal, a personality disordered offender who attempted to
self-harm by refusing food was determined to lack mental capacity,
on grounds that his ability to weigh information “was impaired by
the emotions and perceptions he had at the time… related to his per-
sonality disorder … His spectacles are blinkered … Although he
weighs facts, his set of scales are not calibrated properly…” (R v Col-
lins and Ashworth Hospital ex parte Brady, at para 59; my italics).34
Jodi Halpern has offered a similar argument with respect to the (non-
personality disordered) case of Ms G, who refused post-operative
care and subsequently died when her husband left her for another
woman immediately after she had both her legs amputated. Halpern
argues that Ms G's decision should have been overridden because the
emotional trauma of these circumstances caused her to be unrespon-
sive to evidence and unable to imaginatively think through future
possibilities, including the possibility of ﬁnding future happiness
without her husband.35
Emotions can indeed sometimes “blinker” our ability to deliberate.
E.g. if we are so aroused that we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to retain information,
or if our attention remains focused on certain features of our situation
to the exclusion of others, as it arguably did with Ms G, who may well
have been in a state of shock. On the other hand, there is increasing ev-
idence that, in general, emotions are not disturbances to reasoning and
rationality, but essential to the good working of all deliberative
processes.36 Our emotions can guide us in making correct decisions be-
fore we are able to articulate our reasons or know why we are deciding
aswe are.37 Equally, our emotions can guide us away from our purport-
edly all-things-considered best judgments, showing us what we really
ought to do when, as it happens, our deliberative processes have failed
to be true to our authentic selves.38 Within the literature on clinical
ethics, it is increasingly acknowledged that emotions – including those
which are extremely strong and distressing – can be responsive to and
illuminating of real features of our situation that matter to us deeply,
and so may help us come to better understand ourselves and decide
what to do.39 If the emotional distress of those with PD who want to35 Halpern (2012). For discussion see Craigie (2013) and Mackenzie and Watts (2011).
36 For the classic discussion of theseﬁndingswritten for a general audience, seeDamasio
(1994).
37 For the classic study supporting this ﬁnding, see Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and
Damasio (1997); see also Kahneman (2011).
38 For an important discussion of this phenomenon replete with well-crafted and rich
examples, see Arpaly (2003), especially chapter 2. See too Jones (2004).
39 Cf. Charland (1998, 2011), Halpern (2012), and Mackenzie and Watts (2011).
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riding treatment decisions, whether this argument is offered in princi-
ple or alternatively in accordance with the law as currently encoded
by the MCA, that can only be because something particular about their
emotional state impairs the capacity for autonomous rational delibera-
tion. What could this be?
In discussing Ms G, Robin Mackenzie and John Watts write: “The
tragedy is that in this case therapy or treatment [e.g. for emotional
trauma] might have corrected her assumptions regarding future
quality of life, and a decision to accept the lifesaving treatment
might have resulted” (Mackenzie and Watts, 2011, p. 33). The sug-
gestion is that Ms G's emotionally traumatised state rendered her in-
capable of seeing any possibility of future happiness, while had she
not refused treatment, but instead continued to live and received
therapy, she would have been able to make a more accurate assess-
ment. Transposing this suggestion to the present context suggests
that the great emotional distress experienced by people with PD
who self-harm or attempt suicide renders them incapable of seeing
any possibility of future happiness — when a more accurate assess-
ment would admit hope and that treatment for their personality disor-
der could help them to see this. In other words, the grounds for
overriding treatment refusal would depend on their emotional
state blinding them to the genuine possibility of a better life. Argu-
ably, from the perspective of the law as currently encoded by the
MCA, this could call into question their ability to understand the in-
formation relevant to their decision in an adequate manner.
However, there are two grave difﬁculties with this suggestion.
First, there may realistically be very little hope of a genuine possibil-
ity of future happiness. Personality disorder is enduring and perva-
sive, and people may have been living with great emotional
distress, pain, and suffering for years if not indeed decades. The in-
ductive evidence may be overwhelmingly in favour of the belief
that there is little hope for improvement let alone recovery, and
every reason for despair.40 Second, such possibility as there is likely
depends on the provision of effective treatment, no doubt alongside
social support, and educational, and occupational opportunities. Al-
though, as described in Section 2 there is increasing evidence that
personality disorder can be treated through a range of psychological
interventions, there is a striking lack of provision of services. Many
people with personality disorder simply do not have access to spe-
cialist treatment, adequate social support, or meaningful training
and work opportunities.
Judgements of mental capacity and criminal responsibility must
of course bemade on a case-by-case basis. Ambivalence, unstable de-
sires and values, and emotions which blind people to genuine future
possibilities, can provide grounds for questioning mental capacity
and potentially overriding treatment decisions under current law.
Equally, emotions can impact on the capacity for choice and control,
mitigating criminal responsibility. But, in many cases, people with
PD who engage in self-directed violence are likely to possess mental
capacity, and those who engage in other-directed violence are likely
to meet the conditions for criminal responsibility. There is therefore
no avoiding the impression that people with personality disorder,
like P, can get a raw deal: deemed sufﬁciently mentally well to be
punished under criminal law, but not sufﬁciently mentally well to re-
tain the right to make their own treatment decisions during period of
high risk, despite the fact that they possess mental capacity to do so.
Their autonomy is respected by one branch of the law while
disregarded by another. Aside from the possibility of signiﬁcant
legal reform in either branch of law, what can we do to address this
situation within the conﬁnes of current legislation?40 For discussion of how treatment for personality disorder requires ﬁnding hope in face
of this evidence and how narrative can be a useful clinical tool in doing so, see Pickard
(2014).4. Addressing the ethical dilemma: pragmatism, beneﬁcence, and
autonomy
These “awkward questions” for the law have arisen not only be-
cause of the complexity of personality disorder, but because of our
response to this complexity. On the one hand, we do not want to
stand by and idly watch as people self-harm and die. Many of us de-
spair that members of our society suffer the high levels of psycho-
logical distress and social marginalization typical of PD. This
sentimentmay be compoundedwhenwe recognize the contribution
of underprivileged backgrounds of extreme psycho-social and
economic adversity, often containing childhood trauma, abuse and
neglect. It may also be particularly strong in clinical staff, who
have chosen a profession guided by a duty of care: when the MHA
is used to involuntarily admit people with PD to hospital at risk of
self-harm or suicide, it may well be done out of genuine benevolence
and concern. But, on the other hand, as a society we have not
succeeded in addressing social and economic inequality and child-
hood mistreatment, or provided adequate specialist treatment, so-
cial support, and educational and occupational opportunities for
those with PD.
The Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 asserts: “The Committee
is convinced that if society is to impose a duty to comply with care
and treatment on some of those who suffer from mental disorder it
must impose a parallel duty on health and social care authorities to
provide an appropriate standard of care and treatment for those sub-
ject to compulsion” (Richardson et al., 1999, p. 1). The NICE Guide-
lines for Self-harm: the short-term physical and psychological
management and secondary prevention of self-harm in primary and
secondary care are explicit that the standard and experience of care
is frequently unacceptable (NICE, 2004). People with PD have a
high frequency of hospital admission: theymay be (voluntarily or in-
voluntarily) admitted to hospital in periods of high risk, but then
discharged when risk is lower but without any change in personality
or plan for treatment. Moreover, when the admission is involuntary,
they may understandably resent the intrusion and reject what limit-
ed help exists, so that relationships with clinical staff are worsened,
potentially even evoking early life experiences of coercion and mis-
treatment. The use of the MHA to involuntarily detain people with
PD who possess mental capacity in order to protect them from self-
directed violence may be motivated by benevolence and concern,
but it is arguably not only discriminatory in failing to respect the au-
tonomy of those with mental disorder but in other ways unethical:
relieving our collective conscience of the burden of self-harm and
suicide, but doing little to genuinely help those who are violent to-
wards themselves.
The solution to this ethical dilemma is in principle, if not in practice,
straightforward: improve the provision of specialist treatment, social
support, and life opportunities for those with PD, as mandated by The
Review of the Mental Health Act 1983.
This would have two related effects. First, it would allow involuntary
detention under a Section of the MHA not only to serve the short-term
end of averting self-directed violence, but also the long-term end of pro-
viding treatment which offered the possibility of genuine improvement
and recovery. The harm of failing to respect autonomy, which such uses
of theMHA arguably perpetrate, could then be counter-balanced by the
potential lasting good of this outcome.
Second, it could potentially offer grounds for justiﬁably overriding
treatment decisions under the MCA, based on concerns about mental
incapacity. The difﬁculty transposing the insights from Ms G's case to
people with PD is due to the fact that there may be little hope for im-
provement let alone recovery, in absence of the provision of effective
treatment, social support, and better life opportunities. If we undertake
to provide these as a condition of using the MHA to involuntary detain
thosewith personality disorder at risk of harm to self, and communicate
this during the process of doing so, we transform the future possibilities
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sibilities due to emotional distress and did not weigh them in the deci-
sion to refuse hospital admission and treatment would therefore be
unresponsive to (newly available) evidence andunable to imaginatively
think through (newly available) future possibilities. Grounds for over-
riding treatment refusal under the MCA might therefore exist, and
help to ethically justify involuntary hospital admission under a
Section of the MHA — given, that is, that we were indeed committed
to genuinely providing these resources in the particular case at hand,
and communicated this effectively to the person.41
Although the MHA grants the power to involuntarily detain and
compulsorily treat, psychological treatment for PD requires co-
operation to be effective. People with PD must work to change or
better manage problematic personality traits, which requires willing
participation, motivation and resolve, as well as positive relation-
ships with staff. Clinical skill in framing choices, respecting autono-
my, and establishing trust in order to support decision-making, is
important when working to engage people with PD whose risk is
high. For hospital admission and specialist treatment is much more
likely to be accepted and effective if presented as an offer rather
than a threat. Hence, although the ethical dilemma described above
can be addressed by the provision of specialist treatment, social
support, and life opportunities together with the sincere and clini-
cally skilled offer of these during the process of detaining someone
under a Section, there may be no clinical and correspondingly ethical
value in compulsorily treating people with PD if they continue to
refuse treatment post-admission, as outcomes are likely to be poor.
Indeed, compelling treatment in this context could be seen to com-
pound the failure to respect autonomy, rather than serving to
counter-balance it with the possibility of a positive outcome.42
The moral of P's story is this: it can be vexingly difﬁcult to establish,
in any particular case, whether a person with PD has mental capacity or
meets the conditions for criminal responsibility. When the violence is
self-directed, we may ﬁnd ourselves inclined to intervene benevolently
but also paternalistically, even when our best guess is that mental ca-
pacity is retained, and seek an involuntarily admission to hospital
under a Section of the MHA despite the failure to respect autonomy
this may perpetrate. When the violence is other-directed, we may ﬁnd
ourselves inclined to punish, even when our best guess is that the un-
derlying state of mind may, at least in part, make the action less than
fully autonomous and hence mitigate criminal responsibility. It may
be unrealistic to think these responses or either branch of the law are
likely to change. But we can begin to address the tension and circum-
vent at least some of the ethical problems raised, even in the face of un-
certainty as to the person's underlying state of mind, by doing what a
principle of beneﬁcence recommends in any case: when we intervene
in the life of a person who suffers from personality disorder to limit
self-directed violence, or to punish other-directed violence,43 we simul-
taneously commit to providing the necessary resources to make their
life better.41 Note that an argument with a similar conclusion can be made with respect to our ob-
ligations towardspeoplewith PDwhose violence is other-directed. Given the backgrounds
of extreme psycho-social and economic adversity typical of those with PD, our right to
hold such offenders to account and punish may be predicated on a commitment to provi-
sion of adequate therapeutic and social, educational, and work opportunities that aim to-
wards rehabilitation and reintegration – a very far cry from the present state of the
criminal justice system. See Lacey and Pickard (2013, 2015).
42 For discussion of the nature of effective therapy for PD see NIMHE (2003), NICE (2004,
2011), Pearce and Pickard (2010), Pickard (2013, 2015), and Wood et al. (2014). For an ex-
service user perspective, seeWard (2013) for a commentary on Pickard (2013). It is interest-
ing to note the resonance between the clinical skills needed to support decision-making for
thosewith PD, and the obligations on the state to support and enable decision-making of vul-
nerable people as articulated in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD). Cf. too The Review of the Mental Health Act Section 7.24 (Richardson et al., 1999,
p. 95). For an extremely helpful discussion of threats and offers in mental health care, see
Dunn et al. (2012).
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